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Abstract
The IEEE 802.11 is a set of media access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications
for implementing wireless local area network (WLAN). The protocol was designed with the im-
plicit assumptions that nodes would always follow the protocol rules and regulations. There
was no provision to check for compliance with these rules, neither was there any provision
to enforce such compliance. Consequently, for selfish or malicious reasons, nodes may choose
to deviate from these specifications leading to misbehaviour and denial of service in the MAC
layer. This paper briefly examine the existing solutions to the problem and provides a proposal
for a resilient solution, using the concept of game theory.
Keywords: MAC protocol, security, game theory, adversarial collaboration
1. Introduction
The use of wireless network is graduallyshifting from convenience to mission crit-ical. This has led to exposure of various
forms of vulnerabilities in the IEEE 802.11 wire-
less MAC protocol. The exploitation of these
vulnerabilities has resulted in varieties of cheat-
ing and misbehaviour techniques, with denial
of service (DoS) as the end product. This prob-
lem has been addressed by many researchers,
but it still remains unsolved [1, 3, 7, 12, 20]. A
large number of the proposed solutions centred
around prevention, detection and reaction. A
more resilient approach, we believe, is a proac-
tive one in which node or user misbehaviour
are considered as inevitable and so our aim is
neither to prevent them nor to eliminate them
but to incorporate mechanisms into the MAC
protocol that will adapt it to various forms of
misbehaviour so as to maintain a firm stance
against them. This paper is divided into 5 sec-
tions. Section 1 deals with preliminaries and
introduction. It serves as an introduction to
the subject matter. Section 2 deals with game
theory as a solution tool. In Section 3, the IEEE
802.11 MAC protocol misbehaviour problem,
its scope, and previous solutions are discussed.
Our proposal for resilient solution is discussed
in section 4, while Section 5 is the conclusion
of the study.
2. Basic Game Theory
Game theory is a multi-player decisiontheory. The players of a game are sub-jects that make the decision. The play-
ers participate in a game in order to get max-
imum benefit by selecting reasonable best ac-
tions. Thus the elements of a game includes
players, information, strategy space and payoff
or utility functions [26]. Game theory is a pow-
erful tool for the study of situations of conflict
and cooperation, and is concerned with finding
the best actions for individual decision makers
(i.e., players) in these situations that will lead
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to stable outcomes.
Suppose Mr. X has just graduated from a
university with a first class degree in software
engineering and has a novel idea of develop-
ing a mobile application that will enable users
to drive and control their car using their mo-
bile phone. If he needs to approach Mr. Y
for finance, then there is a need for caution on
both sides. Y may reasons thus: X has no track
record of software development (unlike Google
or Microsoft) and may just be a playboy. On the
other hand, X may reasons thus: Y may take
over the intellectual property and ownership
of the business because of his financial involve-
ment. And so a game has started already with
both parties trying to minimize any risk that
may be associated with such an agreement and
also maximize their benefits, which is referred
to as utility in game terms.
Similarly if two individuals, say Mr. A and
Mr. B mutually agreed on a barter trade (BT) to
exchange goods for goods and both of them are
satisfied with the amounts of goods to be ex-
changed. Suppose for some reason, the trade
must take place in secret with each of them
leaving his bag at a designated place, say in a
forest, and to pick up the other’s bag at another
designated place. Suppose it is clear to both of
them that they may never meet or have further
dealings with each other again. Then clearly,
there is something to be afraid of, namely: the
other person may leave an empty bag.
Obviously, if they both leave a full bag as
previously agreed, they will both be satisfied,
but equally obvious is the fact that, getting
something for nothing is even more ’satisfying’
and ’rewarding’ (from a selfish behaviour per-
spective). So there is a tendency that both of
them will be tempted to leave an empty bag.
In fact, Mr. A can reason it thoroughly and
rigorously in this manner: ’If Mr. B leaves a
full bag as agreed, I will be better off having
left an empty bag, because I would have gotten
all that I wanted and given nothing away. On
the other hand, if he decided to play smarter
and clever than me and leaves an empty bag,
thinking that I will leave a full bag, I will still
be better off having left an empty bag, because
I wouldn’t be cheated. I will gain nothing but
lose nothing either, which is good. Therefore,
no matter what Mr. B chooses to do, I am better
off leaving an empty bag. So I will definitely
leave an empty bag’.
Table 1: BT Matrix Table
Meanwhile, Mr. B, being in more or less
the same situation at the other end, will have
similar thought and reasoning and thus arrives
at the same parallel conclusion that his best
strategy is to leave an empty bag. And so both
of them, with their sophisticated and rational
logic which seems infallible, will leave empty
bags, and return home with empty bags. This
is a practical example of a prison dilemma
game and it illustrates how players’ rational-
ity could lead to suboptimal results in game
theory. If we denote the strategy or action of
leaving a full bag by cooperate (C) and that
of leaving an empty bag (selfish behaviour) as
defect (D), then the matrix table for this barter
game is as shown in Table 1 below in terms
of the player payoffs. A payoff of 5 signifies
maximum utility while a payoff of zero signi-
fies no utility. As discussed above, the best
response strategy for Mr. A and B is to defect
regardless of what strategy the other person
might play. In game theoretic terms, we say
defect is the dominant strategy. Now, how can
we resolve such dilemmas? If the relationship
between the players is to be sustained over a
period of time and the game is to be repeated
several times, then the prospect of future coop-
eration and future retaliation may keep both
players from finking (i.e defecting). In order
words, the prospect of future cooperation and
future retaliation will influence the strategy of
play. It will motivate player to cooperate dur-
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ing the early moves of the game and to defect
towards the end of the game. This is an illus-
tration of Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategy in solving
non-cooperative games.
Games may generally be categorized as non-
cooperative or cooperative. A non-cooperative
game is concerned with the analysis of strate-
gic choices and explicit models for the de-
cision making process of a player out of its
own interests. In cooperative games the play-
ers can make binding commitments. It is a
game where groups of players ("coalitions")
may enforce cooperative behaviour, hence the
game is a competition between coalitions of
players, rather than between individual play-
ers [24]. According to whether the movement
of the players are simultaneous or not, non-
cooperative games can be categorized as static
or dynamic games. In a static game, players
make their choice of strategies simultaneously,
without any knowledge of what the other play-
ers will choose, whereas in a dynamic game
there is a strict order of play. Players take turns
to make their moves, and they know the previ-
ous moves of other players and can take that
into consideration when choosing their strat-
egy of play [21].
2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) Game
An understanding of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
or its variants is useful in appreciating the de-
cision of whether to compete with rivals, or
collude with them, whether to oppose and re-
sist them or simply cooperate with them. In
order to illustrate the kind of difficulties that
may arise between two-person or groups in
non-cooperative variable-sum games, the Pris-
oners Dilemma (PD) game, was originally for-
mulated by a Canadian mathematician, Albert
W. Tucker [4, 22]. It goes as follows:
Two prisoners, A and B, suspected of com-
mitting a bank robbery together, were isolated
and urged to decide simultaneously whether
they want to cooperate or defect, i.e each must
decide whether or not to confess without know-
ing his partners’ decision. Both prisoners, how-
ever, were told the consequences of their deci-
sions as follows:
• if both confess, refer to as ’defect’ (D),
both go to jail for five years known as
the ’punishment’ payoff, P (for bank rob-
bery).
• if neither of them confesses (i. e say noth-
ing to the police), refer to as Cooperate
(C) with each other; both go to jail for one
year as ’reward’ payoff (R) (for carrying
concealed weapons since there is insuffi-
cient evidence for a robbery conviction).
• if one confesses, i.e defect (D), while the
other cooperate (C) by keeping quite, the
confessor goes free for confessing (defect-
ing) and the silent one receives a 20 years
jail term for cooperating with his partner.
The 20 years sentence of the cooperator
is known as the ’sucker’ payoff, S, while
the defector’s condition of ’getting off the
hook’(i.e discharged and acquitted with
zero jail term), is known as the ’tempta-
tion to defect’ payoff, T.
Table 2: PD Matrix Table-A
The matrix table for the PD game is as
shown in Table 2 and Table 3 in terms of payoff
and jail terms. From this matrix table, T = 0, R
= 1, P = 5, and S = 20. T>R>P>S. ( ’>’ should
be read or interpreted as ’better than’, since
the values actually represent the jail term in
years) [4, 22].
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Table 3: PD Matrix Table-B
The explanation of PD is as follows: Though
Prisoner A cannot be sure of what Prisoner B
will do, (even if they had previously agreed on
what to do) he knows that, it is better for him
to confess, when B confesses (he gets 5 years
rather than 20) and also when B remains silent
(he serves zero term rather than a year) and B
will similarly reach the same conclusion. So
the solution would seem to be that, it is better
for each prisoner to confess regardless of what
the other may do and consequently they will
both confess (Defect) and go to jail for five year
each. Therefore Defection (D) is the dominant
strategy.
Paradoxically, however, the two robbers
would have done better if they both adopted
the apparently irrational strategy of cooperat-
ing (C) with each other by keeping quite, since
each would then serve only one year in jail.
The real dilemma in this PD game is that, when
each of the two (or more) parties acts selfishly
and refuse to cooperate with one another, they
do worse than when they act unselfishly and
cooperate with one another.
The dilemma arise as a result of the fact
that although mutual cooperation yields the
highest collective payoff of 1 for each of the
two players, individual defectors will do better
with payoff zero, if the opponent decides to co-
operate. Since selfish players are aware of this
fact, both will defect, meaning none of them
gets the much desired zero payoff. Thus, in-
stead of them sharing the rewarding collective
payoff of 1 that would have been received by
mutual cooperation, they both end up worse
off, with a payoff 5 received as a result of their
individual defection.
The precarious situation of these 2 robbers
will, hopefully, not be applicable to most of us,
however, they are not the only one in this kind
of dilemma. The dilemma applies to business
strategists who may want to outdo their rivals,
and the superpower nations of the world that
engage in arms races [4]. It also applies to in-
ternational trade, politics, economic decision
and military strategies and engagement as well
as well as war against terrorism. It cuts across
every areas of life, which is why the security
protocol developers and the protocol attackers
are facing this same dilemma [25].
Adversarial collaboration i.e cooperating
with an enemy is not a new concept. One of the
early examples of the concept was proposed
by Daniel Kahneman, for two researchers ad-
vocating competing hypotheses to collaborate
on a research project with the goal of resolving
their differences. It was based on the assump-
tion that this would be more productive than
when they are at odds with each other with
each researcher conducting their own experi-
ments individually and publishing conflicting
responses to each others’ papers [2]. Adver-
sarial collaboration requires that people with
opposing goals come to agreement, usually
producing a shared product that reflects the
interests of the adversarial parties. This is why
it applies to the conflict between protocol de-
velopers and protocol breakers. However, ad-
versarial collaboration is not the answer to all
conflict scenarios and whenever it fails to yield
the desire result, Tit-For-Tat (TFT) becomes the
prominent strategy of play. With this little ex-
ploration of basic Game theory, we will now
proceed to its application in MAC protocol se-
curity.
3. MAC Protocol Misbehaviour
3.1 The Problem
It has been observed that security threats towireless networks are increasing and hasaccounted for an increase in MAC layer
misbehaviour due to selfish or malicious rea-
sons, significantly degrading the performance
of wireless networks [3]. A selfish or greedy
node typically misbehaves to improve its own
performance at the expense of the other nodes.
For instance a selfish node in a wireless sensory
network (WSN) may refuse to forward packets
on behalf of other hosts in order to conserve
its energy [19].
A greedy host may exploit the vulnerabil-
ities in IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol to increase
its share of bandwidth. For example, IEEE
802.11 MAC protocol requires nodes compet-
ing for the channel to wait for a back-off in-
terval before transmissions after it observes or
experiences a collision. However, a selfish node
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may deliberately choose to wait for a smaller
back-off interval, thereby increasing its chance
of accessing the channel and hence increasing
its shared throughput at the expense of well-
behaved nodes or users [17].
Similarly, with the implementation of the
MAC protocol in software rather than hard-
ware or firmware on Network Interface Cards
(NIC), it is easy to modify the protocol for mis-
behaviour as discussed in [16]. A change in
protocol parameters in one or a set of nodes
can have a devastating effect on the overall net-
work performance which could lead to Denial
of Service (DoS). While a well-behaved node
strictly obeys the pre-defined protocol rules,
the misbehaving nodes may deviate from the
standard to either cause unfairness problems
or disrupt the network services [19] A misbe-
having node may keep on sending packets in
order to reduce the chance of another node
with lighter load to transmit, thereby monop-
olizing the medium. In a WSN, a node may
send large amount of packets to a specific vic-
tim for forwarding (with the victim being a
forwarding node) thus draining out the energy
of the victim [16].
Two nodes may also collude with each other
to establish a flow with continuous data trans-
mission as discussed in [30], which can deplete
the channel’s capacity to transmit any other
data. A selfish node may adjust its back-off
interval in different ways to access the channel
with higher probability of success as explained
in [16]. One example of this is to choose a
small back-off value rather than a valid gener-
ated random number by the back-off algorithm,
e.g., using range [0,CW/2] rather than [0,CW]
(where CW signifies contention window) or by
generating a small random value regardless
of the range. In the event of a collision or a
busy medium, a selfish node will have a higher
chance of winning the channel than any other
nodes [16].
A selfish node may also set longer time du-
ration than the actual transmission time in its
Ready To Send (RTS) or Clear To Send (CTS)
or DATA frames. Since the neighbour nodes
that overhear such messages are not aware of
the ’deception’, they will adjust their Network
Allocation Vector (NAV) according to the re-
ceived messages and consequently defer longer
time before transmitting [16]. A node can also
adjust the Distributed Coordinated Function
Inter Frame Space (DIFS) or Short Inter-frame
Space (SIFS) time (by selecting smaller values)
to further exacerbate the unfairness [18]. So
while selfish behaviour include misbehaviour
techniques such as the manipulation of pro-
tocol parameters like CW, NAV and DIFS etc,
to take advantage of the weakness in the pro-
tocol design mechanism, malicious behaviour,
on the other hand, aims at disrupting network
devices or services, such as intentionally drop-
ping MAC frames RTS/DATA [18]. All these
evidence points to only one thing: IEEE 802.11
MAC protocol is vulnerable. These vulnerabili-
ties have imposed additional constraint in the
design of a new wireless MAC protocol.
3.2 The Previous Solutions
The various proposed solutions can be catego-
rized as shown in Figure 1
Figure 1: MAC Layer Misbehaviour Solutions
• The intrusion detection approach is
based on developing a long-term profile
of normal activities and identify misbe-
haviour and intrusion by observing de-
viations from the measured profile. The
profiling process may involves data min-
ing, clustering, machine learning, etc.
These methods, though viable will intro-
duce a long delay in the detection process
in addition to their false positive. [13].
• The game theoretic solution based on
the mathematical model of conflicts and
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resolution [14, 23] is another prominent
method that has been used by researchers.
A game could be cooperative or non-
cooperative with each player trying to
maximize its utility, but whether it is a
cooperative or non-cooperative game, it
usually involves a fundamental assump-
tions of rationality and/or perfect knowl-
edge of players which may not be true in
all situations and so may need some mod-
ifications in order to make it a practical
solution.
• The artificial immune system approach
is based on principles adapted from the
Human immune system (HIS) and in
some way similar to the intrusion detec-
tion method. The basic ability of HIS is
an efficient detection of potentially harm-
ful foreign agents (like viruses and bac-
teria). Likewise, the goal of AIS, is the
identification of nodes with behaviour
that could possibly negatively impact the
stated mission of the wireless network
[10, 11]. Like most methods of anomaly
detection, the learning period required to
identify what is ’normal’ is a challenge in
this method, in spite of the low computa-
tion overhead attributed to the method.
• The heuristic approach is based on sys-
tematic evaluation of communication pa-
rameters to detect misbehaviour and then
allocate punishment scheme to serve as
deterrent to the misbehaving node. The
detection technique could be probabil-
ity based and/or involve deviation from
known rules. This heuristic approach
refers to experience-based techniques for
problem solving, that give a satisfactory
solution though it may not be optimal.
This method has been successfully used
by various researchers in [6, 9, 15].
3.3 The Motivation
In spite of the wholesome benefits of wire-
less networks, some organizations are still very
reluctant in deploying them into widespread
usage as a result of these security concerns.
However, as these security issues are being ad-
dressed, Wireless LAN is gradually becoming
increasingly popular to the point that some or-
ganization staff are prepared to stick a rogue ac-
cess point under their desk in the office to pro-
vide themselves with the much desired wire-
less connection even when their organization
security policy clearly forbids such practice.
This is an indication of the potential that lies
ahead of the wireless network if only it could
be made more secure.
In a time frame of just six months, there has
been a massive roll out of wireless networks
in my organization, the University of Hertford-
shire. This is still ongoing and the target is to
have an access point in every 20 square metre
or one access point to 10 users, given that each
user has a minimum of two wireless nodes: a
mobile phone and a laptop. Others may have
IPAD, Kindle and other portable wireless de-
vices. This becomes very significant when con-
sidering a population of more than 30,000 users
in my organization, as does the task of securing
such a number of mobile nodes. Therefore, We
believe that enhancing the MAC protocol with
a resilience feature to ensure that it’s capable of
self-defence without any human intervention
is the best way to go.
Another dimension to this problem of MAC
protocol security is that there are dubious man-
ufacturers and vendors who may implement
any of the cheating techniques as discussed in
section 3.1 above or a combination of them on
their wireless Network Interface Card (NIC) to
violate wireless MAC protocol rules in order
to bring about a performance enhancement of
their products for marketing or sales advan-
tage [27]. The most prominent effect of this
manufacturer or vendor factor is the fact that
it makes a node or a user misbehave without
being aware of it. This because in most cases,
an innocent user who purchases a wireless de-
vice, does not, in general, bother about the
implementation of the IEEE 802.11 MAC pro-
tocol in such device, so the user may use such
a device in ignorance of the hazards it consti-
tutes to other nodes or users. Such a user may
eventually take down the wireless network un-
knowingly and cause a denial of service. Thus,
the motivation behind this study is the desire
to improve wireless network security, not only
to simplify the job of security management, but
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to make the wireless MAC protocol resilient to
misbehaviour by responding adaptively.
4. The Resilient MAC Protocol
4.1 The Overview
According to Wikipedia, the word ro-bust, when used with regard to com-puter software, refers to an operating
system or other program that performs well
not only under ordinary conditions but also un-
der unusual conditions that stress its designers’
assumptions. Robustness has to do with main-
tenance of functionalities of the system against
all odds. It does this by avoiding or preventing
failure, but its performance may suffer in the
process.
Figure 2: Resilient MAC Protocol
On the other hand, a system is resilient
when it can adapt to internal and external chal-
lenges by changing its method of operations
while it continues to perform its function. And
so, resilience represents the capacity of a sys-
tem to anticipate and manage risk effectively,
through appropriate adaptation to its function-
alities. In order words, the resilience approach
reacts intelligently to adverse situations by neu-
tralizing their effect. So while a robust strat-
egy says: ’misbehaviour should not stop the
functionality’ (i.e the focus is on maintaining
functionality against all odds without any fun-
damental changes to the original system), a
resilient strategy says: ’misbehaviour should
be neutralized or managed by changing the op-
erational mode’ (i.e the focus is on adaptation
to odds situations through a fundamental shift
or change in mode of operations).
The IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol in its orig-
inal state is an example of a robust system.
It keeps on working, though with some de-
cline in performance, in the event of misbe-
haviour activities. It has no mechanism in place
to change its operational mode in the event
of misbehaviour and so it may struggle hard
to keep working. However, a resilient based
approach will react intelligently by changing
its operational mode so as to adapt itself to
misbehaviour by working in a strategic mode
while the misbehaviour activity is ongoing,
and switching back to the normal operational
mode when the misbehaviour activity ceased.
In essence, a resilient approach acknowledges
the potential for misbehaviour (i.e deviation
from the rules) and focuses on adapting to it
rather than assuming that all nodes will follow
the rules of engagement.
In our approach, a resilient MAC protocol
is a non-cooperative game in which adversarial
collaboration would have been the best solu-
tion option, however because it is very risky to
trust an adversary even after they have agreed
to cooperate, there is a need to technically
enforce co-operation by providing a negative
incentive associated with the protocol misbe-
haviour. The original MAC protocol encour-
ages cooperation by stating the rule, but then
it leaves players to decide whether to obey the
rule or not. There is no disincentive for mis-
behaviour. Those who misbehave do so as a
result of greediness to gain more bandwidth,
or some other performance enhancement at
the expense of other normal users and in the
process cause a DoS. So, in our approach we
acknowledge that the MAC protocol will some-
times be subjected to nodes’ manipulation and
misbehaviour, and hence make provision for
such scenario in advance by incorporating an
adaptive game module into the protocol as
shown in Figure 2, to adapt the protocol to
misbehaviour when necessary. This is the idea
behind the proposed resilient MAC protocol.
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4.2 The DCF MAC Game Model
In order to provide a game theoretic solution
to the problem of misbehaviour in Wireless
LAN (WLAN), we first analyse the operation
of the IEEE 802.11 DCF MAC from game the-
ory perspective and the interaction between
players (nodes) using static game concept. As
explained earlier, a static game is one in which
all players make decisions (or select a strategy)
simultaneously without the knowledge of the
strategies that are being chosen by other play-
ers. In our DCF game, each player (node) has
two actions space: Transmit or Not transmit
(i.e., Wait) and two strategies: Cooperate (C)
or Defect (D) following from [8]. We then pro-
ceed to modelled the DCF as a non-cooperative
game and in order to do this, we specify the
following:
• the set of Players
• the set of Strategies
• the set of Utilities
Therefore our MAC game can be formulated
as as a 3-tuple:
G =< Ni, Si,Ui >
where
• Ni is the set of players (nodes).
• Si is the strategies or action set of player i,
S = S1 ∗ S2 ∗ ...Sn which is the Cartesian
product of the set of actions available to
each player.
• Ui is a set of utility functions that each
player i wishes to maximize.
4.3 Assumptions
In the application of game theoretic solution to
the problem of misbehaviour in WLAN, one of
the the generic assumptions is that of rational-
ity of all nodes. This in a way means that nodes
are interested in maximizing their own utilities
alone. If we assume they do this regardless
of the cost to other players (selfish behaviour),
then we will end up with all of them being
classified as selfish and thereby misbehaving
nodes. This assumption has been criticized by
many scholars [5] including ourselves simply
because it labels all node as misbehaving which
is a bit on the extreme side and difficult to jus-
tify. So we thought this assumption could be
validated if modified to account for selfish (i.e
misbehaving) nodes as well as normal nodes,
both of which are players in any DCF game.
This modification will result in changing the
way in which MAC protocol game will be for-
mulated and played and consequently the pre-
ferred solution to misbehaving nodes. Now, let
us consider these two classes of nodes in a little
bit of details. Misbehaving nodes are selfish
nodes that try to maximize their own benefit
or utility at the expense of the other nodes by
disregarding the protocol rules. These misbe-
having or selfish nodes are interested in their
own welfare rather the common (social) wel-
fare of all. On the other side of selfish and
misbehaving nodes are good nodes that always
cooperate and obey the protocol rules. We de-
liberately avoid the use of the word ’selfless’
(the opposite of selfish) in referring to them as
that will mean they are self sacrificing or doing
something extra ordinary which is not what
we mean and so we called them normal nodes,
meaning they simply play by the rules. These
normal nodes are also rational in the sense that
they would want to maximize their expected
utility, however not at all cost, that is, not at
the expense of the common goal and common
utility which differentiate them from the selfish
node.
4.4 The Solution Concept
They are two major solution concepts for such
non-cooperative games: one solution concept
is to provide an equilibrium condition (NE) in
which no player can increase its utility by uni-
laterally changing its strategy, a state known as
Nash Equilibrium (NE). The other solution con-
cept is to provides incentives to those players
that behave properly by obeying the protocol
rules and disincentives for nodes that disre-
gard protocol rules for selfish reasons. The
incentives can be in form of good reputation
while disincentives can be in form of bad repu-
tation or punishment scheme for misbehaviour
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[8, 21, 27, 29]. The implementation of reward
and punishment scheme always present some
issues such as the requirement for a monitoring
and detecting host. This could be implemented
at Access Point (AP) or an independent device
may be introduced as a watchdog. Whichever
way it is implemented, this constitutes an ad-
ditional load in the WLAN. In addition to this,
there is no general consensus on the size of the
reward and punishment, so each researcher
implements what seems best to them. And
finally on this, the scalability and adaptabil-
ity of such solutions could be a challenge in
the sense that the detection of misbehaviour
techniques may lead to discovery of evasion
techniques since security implementation is a
hide-and-seek game. Our approach to solve
this problem is to propose mechanisms which
force the selfish nodes to follow the rules under
the threat of retaliation. Hence, rational nodes
(both selfish and normal) will be forced to co-
operate, in order to maximize their expected
payoff.
4.5 The DCF MAC Game Analysis
In order to present our game strategy and so-
lution concept, we analysed the DCF game as
a non-cooperative game in which each node
makes independent decision of whether to
obey or disobey the protocol rules based on
personal motivations best known to them. As
stated earlier for this DCF MAC game, the play-
ers choose their strategies autonomously and
are not bound by any inter-player agreements
except for self-enforceable one (i.e within their
will). For the sake of simplicity, we consider a
number of saturated nodes in the same trans-
mission range: saturated in the sense that they
always have packets to transmit and within the
same transmission range in the sense that they
can hear one another without any interference.
In order to analyse our solution concept to the
problem, we specify:
• Players as wireless nodes (both normal
and misbehaving and selfish).
• Strategies space as: Cooperate (C) mean-
ing obey the protocol rules and Defect
(D) meaning disobey the protocol rules.
• Normal nodes comply with the standard
protocol by using the specified CW and
EBO parameters.
• Selfish nodes violate the protocol stan-
dard by doing the opposite for exam-
ple maintaining a small fixed CW or





2 etc, which can be
represented as CWn and
EBO
n ; n ∈ Z.
• Utility refers to payoff or benefit (e.g.
increase in performance or throughput
gained) which we denote collectively as
throughput.
For the sake of simplicity, let us limit the num-
ber of players (nodes) to 2 for now, the strategy
space are as follows:
• CC when both of them cooperate and
obey the protocol rules.
• CD when node 1 Corporates and node 2
Defects.
• DC when node 1 Defects and node 2 Cor-
porates.
• DD when both players Defect.
Let us consider the different scenarios and their
outcome as follows:
• Scenario 1: When both nodes cooperate
(CC) by obeying the rule, the combined
utility U = Ucc: The two nodes have
an almost equal chance of accessing the
channel. The probability of collision is
minimized and throughput is shared al-
most equally and their combined Utility
is increased.
• Scenario 2: When node 1 cooperates and
node 2 defects CD: node 2 (unfairly) gets
Ud, a higher part of the utility at the ex-
pense of node 1 who gets Uc.
• Scenario 3: When node 1 defects and
node 2 cooperates DC: node 1 (unfairly)
gets Ud, a higher part of the utility at the
expense of node 2 who gets Uc.
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• Scenario 4: When both nodes defect (DD)
by disobeying the rule, the probability of
collision increases considerably and the
utility Udd diminish for both nodes.
We can now illustrate these scenarios as a
normal-form game where:
• Players (P)
• Nodes N = {1, 2}
• Strategies (Action): S = {C, D}
• Utilities Space for the 2 nodes (i.e Possi-
ble Payoffs): Us = {Udd,Ucd,Udc,Ucc}
The game matrix table is as shown in Table 4.
Suppose that the combine utility for both
nodes approaches zero for combine defection
(DD) scenario and it approaches Umax (i.e max-
imum) for combine cooperation (CC) scenario,
then Udd → 0 for a worst case scenario and
Ucc → Umax for a best case scenario, so then,
Us = {0,Ucd,Udc,Umax} ; {0 < Ucd/dc <
Umax}.
If node 1 is playing D, the best strategy
choice for node 2 is to play D as well, playing
C will not do it any good as it offers zero payoff.
Similarly, if node 1 is playing C, the best choice
for node 2 is to play D which is not socially
optimal, but it offers a higher payoff for node 2.
If both players commit to play the strategy C,
they will be better off. The normal-form game
is similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma with D as
the dominant strategy over the C leading to
suboptimal result.
It can be concluded that the CSMA/CA
mechanism of DCF works well if all nodes fol-
low the predefined rules, however, as observed
above, violating the protocol promises greater
rewards. Nodes do not have sufficient infor-
mation on what the other nodes will do and
so may play their best response (most reward-
ing) strategy. If they all decide to violate the
protocol individually to get the grater rewards,
the network performance may suffer leading
to a phenomenon referred to as tragedy of the
commons: a situation in which individuals, act-
ing independently and rationally according to
each one’s self-interest, behave contrary to the
whole group’s long-term best interests [31].
So how can we stimulate cooperation and
make the equilibrium Pareto Optimal and fair
for the common good of all? This is where
the Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategy comes into play.
Although TFT strategy has a deadlock vulner-
ability in its default mode, it can be used in
modified form. In our earlier Barter Trade (BT)
game, it is fairly obvious that the players’ strate-
gic decisions will depend on their likelihood of
future encounters. If they know that they are
destined never to meet again as we assumed,
then defection is the only rational choice, both
players will cheat and end up badly with lit-
tle or no payoff as discussed. Similarly, the
game between the ambitious graduate and his
financier partner as discussed earlier is not any
different: the chance of cooperation is slim if
the relationship is going to be temporary.
Table 4: MAC Game Matrix Table
However, if these games are to be repeated
over a number of times, then a selfish players
will realised that, it is better to cooperate on
the early moves and then cheat only towards
the end of the game. In such an iterated game
when players know the total number of itera-
tions in advance, they do indeed cheat more
often in the final lap. Consequently, all play-
ers tend to cooperate more when the number
of iteration is either unknown or significantly
large [28]. This is a demonstration of the ef-
fectiveness of TFT strategy in stimulation of
cooperation in a non-cooperative game.
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5. Conclusion
There is no guarantee that any nodes(users) will always obey the MAC pro-tocol rules and so whether we like it or
not WLAN user nodes population will always
consist of both selfish (misbehaving) and good
(normal) nodes. Therefore our aim is not to
eliminate or stop selfish behaviour or misbe-
haviour, but to find a middle ground in which
both the normal nodes and selfish nodes can
co-exist without breaking the protocol. That is,
a game in which both selfish and normal user
can achieve a balanced payoff, Pareto efficiency
or social welfare (i.e common good).
In order to achieve this, there is the need to
first acknowledge the fact that the MAC proto-
col will sometimes be under attack or subjected
to manipulation and node misbehaviour and
then make provision for such scenarios in ad-
vance by incorporating a resilient module into
the protocol stack as shown in Figure 2 to han-
dle such odd situations whenever they arise so
that the protocol can continue to work without
little or no hindrance in hostile and adversarial
condition.
This is the idea behind the proposed re-
silient MAC protocol. Since game theory offers
ways to formulate and solve problems posed
by players in a conflict or non-cooperative en-
vironment like the WLAN, it can serve as a
favourable tool for analysis of the IEEE 802.11
DCF MAC protocol and in finding the optimal
operating points in such an adversarial condi-
tion as discussed, so that the much preferred
collaboration between primitive users and so-
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